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Abstract. Large amounts of jihadi video content on YouTube along with the 
vast array of relational data that can be gathered opens up innovative avenues 
for exploration of the support base for political violence. This exploratory study 
analyses the online supporters of jihad-promoting video content on YouTube, 
focusing on those posting and commenting upon martyr-promoting material 
from Iraq. Findings suggest that a majority are under 35 years of age and 
resident outside the region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with 
the largest percentage of supporters located in the United States. Evidence to 
support the potential for online radicalisation is presented. Findings relating to 
newly formed virtual relationships involving a YouTube user with no apparent 
prior links to jihadists are discussed. 
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1  Introduction 
Jihadists increased virtuality post-9/11 inspired one analyst to coin the descriptor “al 
Qaeda 2.0” [1] and another to liken jihadis deployment of cyber-based tools to their 
own “stealth ‘revolution in military affairs’.” [2] Much of the original online jihadist 
content was text-based, either in the form of traditional websites with a heavy reliance 
on text or more dynamic Internet message boards and forums. However, technological 
advances, particularly the increased availability of sophisticated, but cheap and easy 
to use video capturing hardware (e.g. hand-held digital video cameras, mobile 
telephones, etc.) and editing software meant that moving images began to play a much 
greater role in the jihadists information strategy from 2003. Nevertheless, much of 
this video content remained quite difficult to access for Westerners and others as it 
was located on Arabic-only websites, many of which were also quite unstable in 
terms of changing their URLs regularly, and were therefore trafficked only by those 
who were strongly committed to gaining access to such content on a regular basis and 
prepared to bear the time and other costs consequent upon the above. The 
establishment of YouTube and similar video-sharing sites, on the other hand, brought 
about a democratisation of access to jihadi video content as a result of the significant 
decrease in costs they introduced. Not only did YouTube become an immediate 
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repository for large amounts of jihadist video content, but the social networking 
aspects of the site also facilitate interaction between those who post video and those 
who comment upon it thus opening new possibilities for a.) radicalisation via the 
Internet, but also b.) empirical analysis of same. 
2  Related Work 
Post-9/11 there was a marked increase in research on al-Qaeda and related 
organisations—here referred to as jihadists—including their Internet-based 
information strategies. Much recent work in this area considers online content 
produced by jihadists and their supporters, [3] with a particular emphasis on the 
content of jihadist video and the identification of various genres of same. [4], [5], [6] 
The question that then arises is the impact of this content on audiences, a matter 
which has seen a recent upsurge in interest on the part of both policy makers [7], [8], 
[9] and funders [10] [11] seeking to learn more about processes of violent 
radicalisation, particularly the possibility of ‘self-radicalisation’ or ‘auto-
radicalisation’ via the Internet. While there are a number of examples of individuals 
who have claimed to have used the internet extensively in the process of radicalisation 
(e.g. Hussain Osman, one of the London bombers, claimed to have been influenced by 
watching video footage of the conflict in Iraq along with reading about jihad in an 
online environment), there is a dearth of published academic research addressing this 
issue. While there are several good reasons why this may be so, probably the most 
pressing problem faced by researchers in this domain has been the difficulty of 
accessing fora where individuals might be radicalised and tracing the process as 
opposed to exploring dedicated jihadist forums.  Specifically, Bruce Hoffman has 
criticised Marc Sageman, in his Leaderless Jihad, for neglecting to employ social 
network theory and associated methods to evidence his argument as to al-Qaeda’s 
present structure, which Sageman claims is largely horizontal/bottom-up rather than 
hierarchical. [12] [13] In this paper, we explore the feasibility of utilising social 
network tools to investigate the possibilities of auto-radicalisation via the Internet not 
through analysis of jihadist sites per se, but exploration of a global portal through 
which anyone can access jihadist content.   
3  Methodology 
The purpose of the present research is to evidence the possibility that the functioning 
of Web 2.0 facilitates radicalisation of youth with and without prior inclination 
toward jihadist activity, which is distinct from traditional online information provision 
strategies targeted, as Sageman asserts, at “already made-up minds.” [13] The focus is 
on those posting and commenting upon martyr-promoting material from Iraq. It was 
undertaken in order to assess the feasibility and usefulness of carrying out a 
considerably larger study of supporters of jihadi video content on YouTube utilising 
both content analysis and network analysis techniques with a view to contributing 
substantive empirical research to the debate on online radicalisation. 
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3.1  Why YouTube? 
YouTube was established in February 2005 as an online repository facilitating the 
sharing of video content. YouTube claims to be the “the world’s most popular online 
video community.” [14] Independent evidence of leadership in the online video 
sharing market is provided by a 2007 report from the Pew Internet and American Life 
Project, which put the percentage of US online video viewers using YouTube at 27%, 
ahead of all other video sharing sites. In the 18 to 29 year old age groups, this 
leadership is even more pronounced with 49% of US online video viewers using 
YouTube. [15] In fact, CNNMoney reported that in January 2008 alone, nearly 79 
million users worldwide viewed more than three billion YouTube videos. [16] As far 
back as August 2006, The Wall Street Journal estimated that YouTube was host to 
about 6.1 million videos, and had about 500,000 user accounts [17] while, according 
to Wikipedia, by April 2008 YouTube acted as host of over 83 million videos and 
3.75 million user channels. [18] 
Registered users can easily upload video content to YouTube, while casual users 
can search for video content using categorical and keyword search facilities. Links to 
material can be posted on other websites to direct one to content on YouTube. 
Registered users can choose to broadcast to all other users or a select group. Along 
with uploading and viewing video content, registered users can create their own 
dedicated page/profile, save favourites, create and share playlists, and rate and 
comment on all YouTube content. All user activity on YouTube is free of charge.1 
YouTube was the platform chosen for analysis due to: 
1. the global appeal of the YouTube site in conjunction with the proliferation of 
easily accessible jihadi video content posted 
2. the demographic data provided by posters 
3. the extensive commentary from viewers on both videos and individual profiles 
4. the potential for analysis of links to friends, group memberships, subscription to 
channels, and similar.  
A focus on YouTube allows one to track the whole range of this data over time, which 
permits longitudinal analysis, including content analysis, dynamic network analysis, 
and so forth.  
 
                                                          
1
 Registered users—individuals and groups—can broadcast without any pre-publishing 
censorship; however, any user can easily flag content as inappropriate simply by clicking a 
link provided on every video’s web page. The website ‘Terms of Use’ indicate types of 
content YouTube deem inappropriate, including “bad stuff like animal abuse, drug abuse, or 
bomb making.” Nor is the posting of “graphic or gratuitous violence” said to be permissible: 
“If your video shows someone getting hurt, attacked, or humiliated, don't post it.” [19] Once 
a video is flagged, YouTube say that the content is reviewed by YouTube administrators, 
with immediate removal of content that blatantly violates YouTube’s terms of usage and 
‘over 18’ access restrictions put in place in cases where the video content remains online, but 
is deemed inappropriate for access by those under 18 years of age. 
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3.2  Data Collection 
Due to the vast amount of jihadist video available, it was necessary in this instance to 
narrow this exploratory research to martyr-promoting content arising out of conflict in 
Iraq. It was also decided to use fairly basic search terms that might occur to any 
young person with exposure to mass-media coverage of contemporary jihadist 
activity. Thus the keywords chosen for searching for appropriate material via the 
YouTube search facility were Iraq and Martyr. The Arabic translations of the word 
‘martyr’, such as shahid and َه ش , were also utilised and paired with the keyword 
‘Iraq’. All returned results were reviewed to exclude material not deemed pertinent to 
this study. All material mocking jihad and martyrdom was, for example, excluded. All 
the remaining content (n = 240) was, in one way or another, supportive of martyrdom 
and included videos hailing and praising individual martyrs, pre-martyrdom 
recordings, funerals of martyrs, and explicit calls to martyrdom.  
The present analysis is based upon a random sample of 50 of these videos, 
accompanying comments and user data from those who posted material and those 
who chose to comment. The videos in this sample of 50 were posted by 30 individual 
users and were commented upon by 940 separate users for a total of 1443 comments 
in all, as of July 2007. Each of the 50 videos was viewed and categorised using 
content analysis techniques. Details including YouTube user ratings (rate), number of 
ratings, number of views, and number of comments were recorded for each video. 
Videos were ranked according to the number of views.2  
Discourse and content analysis techniques were employed to review all 940 users’ 
comments and individual profiles in order to categorise each as a 1.) ‘supporter,’ 2.)  
‘critic,’ 3.) ‘neither,’ or ‘impossible to determine.’ Users were only categorised as a 
supporter when there were explicit statements of support for jihad-related activity. 
Users were categorised as critics when there was evidence of a clear challenge to 
those posting or supporting the videos, or hate speech targeted at Muslims. Postings 
that contained text that did not clearly fit the supporter or critic categories were 
assigned to the third category. Demographic details were manually extracted from all 
user profiles, including age and current location. Additional demographic details were 
obtained from text contained within user profiles (e.g. national or ethnic markers). 
All data was input to ORA Dynamic Network Analysis software [20] for 
evaluation purposes. This resulted in the identification of several key actors and cases, 
one of which is detailed below.3 
4  Results and Discussion 
Presented in Table 1 are the top ten videos in terms of number of views. Rate refers to 
the average rating given by those who chose to rate each video. As can be seen, 50% 
                                                          
2
 On a more recent review of these videos, it was found that thirteen are no longer available for 
viewing on YouTube with ten removed for violation of YouTube Terms of Use and the 
remaining three removed by those who posted the content. 
3
 A manual ‘crawl’ identified linked actors and associated data for the purposes of the case 
study. 
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of the top ten are videos hailing individuals as martyrs, while a further 30% contain 
footage of suicide bombings.4  
 
Table 1. Top ten videos in terms of number of views 
Rank Description Rate Number 
of ratings Number of views 
Number of 
comments 
1 Footage of suicide bombing 4 240 196626 814 
2 Martyr hailing 4 302 173810 211 
3 Funeral of martyr 4.5 88 86917 144 
4 Martyr hailing 4.5 144 68486 207 
5 Martyr hailing 5 54 55330 78 
6 Footage of suicide bombing 4.5 27 44637 88 
7 Martyr hailing 4 97 41070 142 
8 Call to martyrdom 4.5 76 34142 133 
9 Footage of suicide bombing 4 37 30838 102 
10 Martyr hailing 5 51 26108 61 
 
There are many different aspects of the data collected that could be reported upon 
here, but due to space restrictions it was decided to focus primarily upon issues 
deemed to be those most germane to the radicalisation process: demographic 
information, including age profiles and geographical location information, and the 
presentation of individual case findings. Identifiers used in the presentation of results 
have been altered to disguise YouTube user names. 
4.1  Age Profile 
Here ‘Age’ refers to the ‘age’ given by individuals in their personal profiles on 
YouTube. Means, ranges and percentages relate to those who displayed their age on 
their profiles. The default setting is to display age information—it is necessary to 
change profile settings to hide age—thus the majority of users (89%) displayed age 
details. The age of those who posted material analysed within this study ranged from 
18 to 72 years. The mean age was 27.9 years, while 85% fell within the 18 to 34 age 
bracket. The age of supporters ranged from 15 years to 72 years, with a mean age of 
26.7 years. Some 86% of supporters were within the 18 to 34 years range. 
According to figures presented by YouTube in the promotion of advertising in 
August 2007, and since removed from the webpage concerned, they claimed that only 
some 19% of their total users fall within the 18 to 34 year old age group, resulting in a 
dramatic 67% difference between YouTube’s expected numbers for ‘average’ users in 
this age range and those supporting martyr-promoting content. There are a number of 
                                                          
4
 Important to note is that the data contained within Table 1 is data collected during August 
2008, hence the number of comments has increased somewhat since the recording of 
comments for analysis in July 2007. 
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possible explanations for this difference. One of the most likely is that people are 
lying about their ages. Certainly some profiles contain spoof information: it is 
unlikely that both NU0159 and SU0331 are 107 years old.  There is one particularly 
compelling reason for some YouTube users to lie, however: individuals must be over 
18 to view content that has been flagged by other users as ‘inappropriate’. It is 
possible therefore that many within the 18 to 34 year old category are actually under 
the age of 18 years as over 13% of the martyr-promoting videos that remain on 
YouTube, as of August 2008, were accessible to over 18s only.  
4.2  Geographical Location 
‘Location’ refers to the current ‘location’ stated by individuals in their personal 
profiles on YouTube. Percentages are based on the total that displayed location on 
their personal profile, which amounted to 75% of the sample. Table 2 shows the top 
five locations in terms of the number of commentators. 
Table 2.  Top five locations in terms of number of commentators 
Rank Location Percentage of commentators 
1 United States 35% 
2 United Kingdom 17% 
3 Canada 8% 
4 Australia 4% 
5 Germany 3% 
 
More than half the commentators were located in the United States and the United 
Kingdom alone. In terms of supporters, the dispersal was not radically different. Eight 
percent of supporters claimed to be located in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). Of the 92% that were located outside MENA, 3% were located in 
Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority state. Together the top five 
countries in terms of supporters (see Table 3), all Western, account for 76% of all 
support. Eight percent of support originated in sub-Saharan Africa. Interesting to see 
is that the top five, in terms of commentators and supporters are the same except the 
switching of Germany and Australia in ranking. Even more interesting is that both the 
United States and Germany have a higher proportion of supporters when compared to 
that of commentators. 
Table 3. Top five locations in terms of number of supporters 
Rank Location Percentage of supporters 
1 United States 42% 
2 United Kingdom 15% 
3 Canada 8% 
4 Germany 7% 
5 Australia 4% 
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Supporters of martyr promoting video content in the context of Iraq are 
geographically dispersed. At least one individual claimed to be on Bouvet Island, 
which is generally accepted as uninhabited by humans! Interestingly, only 3% of 
supporters claim Iraq as their current location. Perhaps more surprisingly, just 19% of 
those who posted martyr-promoting material related to Iraq, identified Iraq as their 
location. In fact 15% were located in the United Kingdom, while 12% were located in 
the United States. This means that either users are not accurately stating their location 
or video content is circulating through online social networks. The latter is the more 
likely explanation as there seems no logical reason to lie about being within Iraq, 
unlike a situation where users are located in territories where they perceive a more 
‘big brother’ type scenario is operating in terms of online surveillance. SU0590, who 
identifies himself as a Pakistani engineer with an MBA in Marketing, comments on 
the geographical dispersal of the ‘mujahedin’: 
 
“in american army there are only americans, in russian only 
russians and israel only israelis, but amoung muslim mujahideens, 
there are men offaith from across the globe, from bangladesh, from 
pakistan, from uae, from saudia arabia, from sodam, from uk, from usa, 
from  chychinia, from indonesia, from scotland, from germany all over 
the world, this is true brotherhood” [sic] 
 
SU0590’s list of locations largely concurs with the findings of this study. Australia 
and Sweden are the noted exceptions.  
This leads to the question of the extent of diaspora support. It is difficult to 
estimate accurately the extent that support from those located in the West is from 
members of the MENA diaspora. However, from analysis of the commentary, some 
evidence has emerged. For example a 26 year old located in Australia, claims in his 
comments that he is originally from Gaza, that he moved to Australia one year 
previously and that he fought for Hamas from the age of 15. User PU0789 while one 
year ago claiming to be located in Austria now claims to be located in Iraq. One may 
ask why a user would deliberately change their profile to claim a new location. 
Possible is that this poster of video content is now in Iraq. Of course there is no way 
to verify such claims without data such as IP addresses used for access to YouTube. 
NU0542, who identifies himself as a 39 year old based in Sweden, has amongst his 
favourite videos three soccer matches, all featuring the Algerian national team, while 
SUO860, a 26 year old based in the UK, also displays links to Algeria within his 
personal profile. Strong support was seen from those located in Sweden relative to 
population size, though this may be explained by the influx of Iraqi refugees in recent 
years. In 2007, Sweden was estimated to be accepting approximately 1,000 refugees 
per month from Iraq, though the majority of these were reported to have been those 
who had aided MNFI forces in some way [21]. 
4.3  Individual Case Findings 
While a larger scale research project is underway to perform network analysis on the 
data collected, limits to this paper prevent all findings to date being presented. A 
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number of what may be described as key actors have already been identified through 
network analysis techniques. The following is simply one of a number of cases 
worthy of discussion.  
On viewing the profile of SU0798, a twenty-seven year old located in the 
Netherlands, nothing alarming in terms of support for martyrdom or jihad was 
obvious. Analysis of SU0798’s comments on various videos illustrate a somewhat 
different picture, however, with comments including: 
 
“in your dreams, you have no idea what islam is. Islam will take 
over teh world, you just wait and see. Every year about 20 000 
americans become muslim, you should get rid of your idea and find the 
real truth. America will be concured from within. Allahu Akbar la 
illaha illa ALLAh” [sic] 
 
On further scrutiny of SU0798’s profile, a comment can be found made by NU0958 
citing his admiration for Islam and his wish to convert. NU0958 is a twenty-one year 
old rugby fan located in Ireland. From comments made on his profile it is claimed that 
he is about to pursue a named university degree shortly. One day later NU0983 also 
located in Ireland posted “You’ve got to be joking about what ye said on [SU0798]’s 
page about wanting to convert to Islam !” on NU0958’s profile. On analysis of all 
commentary on NU0958’s profile, including linkages to other YouTube users, it was 
revealed that he had two new friends posting numerous comments within weeks of 
publicising his wish to convert. These friends included NU0977 and NU0991.  
NU0977, a student of medicine at a prestigious United Kingdom university talks 
about family links in Egypt and claims that he doesn’t like al Qaeda. Upon following 
links to his YouTube subscriptions however, it is clear that he subscribes to more 
radical views than claimed when communicating with NU0958, the Irish rugby fan. 
NU0977, also a rugby fan and a fan of Zinedine Zidane the former French soccer 
player of Algerian descent, as evidenced by his favorite videos, has in less than five 
months since opening his YouTube account watched 8278 videos, has 583 subscribers 
and 28,752 channel views. His playlist contains 110 ‘Convert to Islam’ videos, 127 
‘Israel the Terrorist’ videos, 45 ‘9/11 is a lie’ videos.  
The second new acquaintance of the Irish rugby fan, NU0991 claims to be a 15 
year old United States based female whom appeals to the rugby fan not to tell anyone 
about her real age in case it causes her not to be taken seriously. Extensive 
commentary on her YouTube channel with almost 1500 comments in just eight 
months since launching her account coupled with statistics like 2819 videos watched, 
27 subscribers, 7660 channel views suggest a very busy 15 year old. Her profile 
contains a hyperlink to a number of external websites including one that accepts 
donations for ‘the cause.’ While NU0991’s profile and commentary suggests the 
preaching of moderate Islam, further scrutiny of linkages from her profile suggest a 
well organised mission to not only convert westerners to Islam, but also links to 
radicals. Not only are NU0977 and NU0991 friends on YouTube, but they are both 
members of a 600+ member group with a mission to convert ‘infidels.’ Notable is the 
previously cited claim from SU0798 that 20,000 Americans are converting to Islam 
every year along with his belief that America will be conquered from within. On a 
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random selection of 20 members of the 600+ member group, five profiles claim 
recent conversion to Islam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Partial Network Visualisation of Case Study 
 
This single brief case study is illustrative of the possibilities that are presented by 
Web 2.0 applications that integrate information provision functions with social 
networking (See Figure 1). NU0958 went from browsing a generic website to 
suddenly being integrated into a specific network by virtue of a single posted 
comment. Essentially, he was targeted by heavy users, with radical links, whose aim 
at a minimum was religious conversion. NU0958 was not, following Sageman, a 
“made-up mind” [13] but instead a young person who has the potential to become 
exposed to radical thinking as a result of Internet browsing practices that literally tens 
of millions of young people engage in every day.  
NU0991 
Age: 15 
Location: United States 
Origin: Egypt 
Occupation: Student 
 
NU0977 
Location: United Kingdom 
Origin: Egypt 
Occupation: Student 
 
SU0798 
Age: 27 
Location: Netherlands 
Comments: “America will 
be conquered from within” 
NU0983 
Location: Ireland 
Origin: Ireland 
Comments: “You’ve got to be 
joking about what ye said…” 
NU0958 
Age: 21 
Location: Ireland 
Origin: Ireland 
Occupation: Student 
Comments: Expresses interest in 
600+ Group 
Comments: Mission to 
“convert infidels” 
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5  Conclusion 
The main findings of this study are that the vast majority of those who posted martyr-
promoting video on YouTube and those who supported this content were in the 18 to 
34 year age bracket, 85% and 86% respectively. While one may accept that the 
majority of YouTube commentators are located in the West, one may also expect that 
the vast majority of support would be from the MENA region. In fact, to the contrary, 
the vast majority of supporters are located outside the MENA region, with 76% in just 
five Western countries, led by the United States with 42% followed by the UK with 
15% of all supporters. Notable is that the percentage of supporters is higher than the 
percentage of commentators for two of these Western countries, the United States and 
Germany. In other words they have a higher proportion of supporters than those that 
just provide commentary.  
With regard to the case study, of course one cannot claim with certainty that the 
Irish rugby fan is being radicalised. Perhaps he is simply on the path to conversion to 
Islam; on the other hand, his remarks although attracting attention may have been 
insincere. Nevertheless, NU0958’s experience is evidence of the potential for online 
radicalisation of those with no apparent prior links to jihadists.  
As previously stated, this research is merely an exploratory study to evaluate the 
feasibility of a larger scale project to explore the support base for political violence 
amongst the online audience of jihad-promoting video content on YouTube. It is only 
with the proposed larger sample and more in-depth analysis that one can come to 
more concrete conclusions. One must therefore err on the side of caution in relation to 
the conclusions of this study. While a considerable amount of data was analysed, this 
remains a relatively small exploratory study. What is clearly evident however is that 
jihadist content is spreading far beyond traditional jihadist websites or even dedicated 
forums to embrace, in particular, video sharing and social networking—both 
hallmarks of Web 2.0—and thus extending their reach far beyond what may be 
conceived as their core support base in the MENA region to diaspora populations, 
converts, and political sympathisers.  
With this focus on the potential for bottom-up radicalisation, we do not mean to 
discount Hoffman’s argument regarding the continued importance of top-down 
activity. [12] Quite clearly there are two separate, but overlapping processes at work 
here, top-down and bottom-up, and operating at multiple levels. With regard to top-
down activity, for example, it can be viewed as facilitation of real-world violence 
with respect of “already made-up minds” [13] while in the present case it may simply 
refer to the online targeting of vulnerable youth without prior interest in jihadism by 
those with radical views. Bottom-up activity, on the other hand, can encompass all 
individual consumption of jihadist materials online, whether via targeted searching 
and selection or random browsing.  
What can be concluded with certainty is the feasibility of using mixed methods 
such as content analysis and network analysis of the available data over a time period, 
which can be utilised to explore the support base for political violence on YouTube. A 
larger scale analysis can be used to trace linkages from the most significant actors 
identified within the network and endeavouring to present more concrete findings in 
terms of the extent of radicalisation efforts related to the viewing of jihad-promoting 
video. 
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